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Preface
The spring 1984 election of Jose Napoleon Duarte as constitutional president of El
Salvador may mark the start of a new and significant phase in the troubled history of that
small Central American republic. Duarte is the first popularly elected civilian president to
take office in his country in more than 50 years. A moderate Christian Democrat, Duarte
faces the difficult task of bringing both peace and justice to a nation ravaged by violence.
The United States is interested in the Salvadoran situation not only because of the
political, economic, and national security consequences for this country, but also because of
our profound humanitarian concern about the widespread suffering caused by the prolonged
conflict. Yet, despite the growing American media attention and political debate, El Salvador
and its Central American neighbors remain virtually unknown peoples and places for even
well-informed American voters and national leaders.
To help enlighten Americans as to the roots of the current Salvadoran dilemma and to
provoke discussion of United States policy in the Central American region, The Strom Thurmond
Institute of Government and Public Affairs invited five experts in Latin American affairs to
visit the campus of Clemson University in February 1984 and share their knowledge and in
sights into the subject with students, faculty, the media, and the general public. The principal
event of that two-day program was a public symposium, the proceedings of which are found
in this publication.
Although the panelists could not agree on how to resolve El Salvador's present dif
ficulties, they did agree that the situation is volatile and the product of complex national and
international historical processes. A majority also agreed that any hope for lasting improve
ment of this situation must involve the larger Latin American family of nations. The United
States can help, but it cannot unilaterally dictate the destiny of El Salvador or its neighbors.
I appreciate the insights provided by the experts in this symposium, and I congratulate
The Strom Thurmond Institute for sponsoring this enlightening program on one of the most
critical issues of our time.
Charles H. Percy
United States Senator
Illinois
Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
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Opening Remarks
Dr. Arbena
On behalf of The Strom Thurmond Institute and the entire Clemson University com
munity, I welcome you to this symposium on El Salvador, its current situation, the
background of that situation, and its implications for the United States. I extend to our five
distinguished panelists a special welcome to Clemson University. We are delighted that you
are here, and we look forward this afternoon to a most enlightening discussion.
This is not structured as a debate. We have not assigned positions, but I assume that with
the development of the program you will notice at least some different perspectives emerg
ing, and these should lead us into an exchange of opinions.
With a population of some five-and-one-quarter million people living in an area slightly
smaller than the state of Massachusetts, the Central American republic of El Salvador has
recently assumed a place in world affairs seemingly out of proportion to its size, wealth, and
traditional influence. That such a small and relatively poor country has suddenly become so
important to so many people is demonstrated by our presence here today. Not long ago,
Clemson University would hardly have sponsored such a symposium, and you in the au
dience would not have been present in such a large number. But several years of highly visi
ble violence, rising levels of U.S. economic and military aid, volatile conditions in neighbor
ing isthmian countries, claims in this country that El Salvador poses a strategic challenge to
the United States, plus endless rounds of political debate have made us aware that
something very important is going on in a place few Americans knew about or cared much
about a few years ago.
How tragic and how normal that we must wait for a crisis and a sense of immediate
danger before we in the United States take time to look at people so close to us whose
history, culture, and circumstances should interest us in their own right.
Be that as it may, we hope today to redress some of this ignorance concerning El
Salvador by drawing on the experiences of five highly qualified experts whom I now shall in
troduce to you.
Our first speaker is Dr. Ralph Lee Woodward, Jr., professor of Latin American history at
Tulane University, the institution from which he earned his doctorate in 1962. Dr. Woodward
has a dozen books and 45 articles published or in preparation, most dealing with Central
America. Among other projects, he is currently planning a survey history of El Salvador. He
will offer us a brief historical background of the current Salvadoran dilemma.
A native of Cuba, Enrique Baloyra earned his Ph.D. from the Universtiy of Florida in
1971. Presently, he is professor of political science and director of the Institute of Latin
American Studies at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Though his earlier work
focused primarily on Venezuela, he has become increasingly involved in the study of Central
America, publishing in 1982 El Salvador in Transition and, more recently, several articles on
what he calls Salvador's "reactionary despotism." He will sketch for us the present domestic
political alignment in El Salvador.
Ralph Elihu Becker is a man of varied interests and experiences. With his law degree
from St. John's University, Mr. Becker has built a distinguished career in government service,
charitable and civic organizations, and Republican Party politics. Among his many con
tacts with Latin America, Mr. Becker counts a tour as ambassador to Honduras. In a society
that often pays no more attention to the arts than it does to Latin America, Mr. Becker pro
vides an admirable model in his labors in behalf of theatre and music, serving as a founding
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trustee and general counsel of the Kennedy Center and as a benefactor of The Smithsonian
Institution. Mr. Becker's perspective today is that of the U.S. diplomat in Central America.
Michael Barnes represents the Eighth Congressional District of Maryland. He was elected
to Congress in 1978. Prior to that time, Congressman Barnes earned his undergraduate
degree at The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill and his law degree from The George
Washington University. A Democrat, Congressman Barnes is quickly gaining stature in the
House, especially in his role as chairman of the Western Hemisphere Affairs Subcommittee
of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. In addition, he serves on the Subcommitte on Inter
national Economic Policy and Trade and functions as an assistant majority whip. He will
speak of the congressional concerns in El Salvador.
Few Latin Americans have had as distinguished a career as Alejandro Orfila. A native of
Mendoza, Argentina, he studied law at The University of Buenos Aires and later at Stanford
and Tulane. He began his diplomatic career in 1946, and over the next 16 years served in
such posts as Moscow, Warsaw, Tokyo, and Washington. After 11 years in priyate business
and consultant work in international finance and economic affairs, Mr. Orfila returned to the
United States as Argentine ambassador in 1973. Two years later, he was elected fifth
secretary general of the Organization of American States. After being reelected to that
demanding position, he chose to resume just this year his private career, entering the field of
public relations. From Ambassador Orfila, we shall hear the viewpoint of a Latin American
who resides outside the Central American area.

Dr. Woodward
I think my message to you is that the current conflict in El Salvador - and, indeed, in the
rest of Central America - is very deeply rooted in the past. What I see happening in Central
America is the inevitable collapse of political, economic, cultural, and social structures that,
in some ways, have their roots in the early 16th century.
El Salvador is not as old as some of the other nations in Central America. For much of the
colonial period, it was simply a part of the province of Guatemala, not like Nicaragua, or
Honduras, or even Costa Rica which were separate provinces within the Kingdom of
Guatemala. El Salvador was simply a part of Guatemala. But, as it began to emerge as a
distinct economic region and a producer of the most important export - indigo - it emerged
in its own national sense and was recognized in the late colonial period.
For 300 years, the Kingdom of Guatemala endured. After 1840, however, Salvadoran na
tionalism came to the fore, and there was rivalry with the mother country of Guatemala.
After the breakdown of the Central American Union, two major parties emerged. I am not
going into the details of the two parties except to say that the conservative party of the 19th
century was based on the feudal tradition, which is very strong in Central America. The Con
quistadores had brought this tradition with them and emphasized certain paternalistic rela
tionships between the land-holding elite and the campesinos - the peasants - and, by
contrast, the liberal party was essentially a product of the 18th century enlightenment, which
emphasized economic liberalism and Adam Smith's conception of the economy. The liberal
party eventually triumphed in every Central American state - and specific.ally in El Salavdor and gained control by the 1870s.
Thereafter, a small group of families came to dominate that party. Traditionally, they are
known as "the Fourteen Families." They espoused economic liberalism, particularly the idea
of developing strong agricultural exports and coffee. Eventually, however, they moved into
other crops as well. So, El Salvador became almost the classic state in all of Latin America
where all of the resources of the country were put into an effort to develop exports. Land that
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once had been communally owned and farmed by Indians and by the mestizo population
was turned gradually into coffee lands, and in time there was less land for subsistence farm
ing and more land for export crops.
In a limited sense, this approach was highly successful. San Salvador became one of the
most modern cities in Central America. The elite became very wealthy; the country was the
first in Central America to have paved roads; and, for a while, it was regarded as having the
best schools. Real progress, then, came from the liberal approach to economic develop
ment. But, inevitably, this approach had the effect of expanding the middle class in San
Salvador and that led to a challenge to the Fourteen Families who continued to hold the
political power of the nation very closely. These liberals turned out to be not so liberal once
they got in power: They did not share this power either with the masses or with the emerging
middle class. The final phase of Central American history, then, has been a challenge to
liberalism which can be dated from a rather violent, though fairly small, uprising in 1932 in
El Salvador in which perhaps 30,000 people were killed in the process of suppressing the
revolt.
It goes much further, however. After World War II, more modern political parties emerged
from the middle class, of which the most important was the Christian Democratic Party. This
is a phenomenon we have seen all across Latin America, but it is very clear that in Central
America the middle class-based, more modern political parties have challenged the old elite:
the Fourteen Families. The Fourteen Families, on the other hand, have become 254 families
at last count. They are still an extended oligarchy, but they are into a lot more things today
than just coffee.

Dr. Baloyra
From Professor Woodward's presentation, one very important point can be distilled: the
idea that reactionary despotism is a particularly authoritarian form of capitalism. That is to
say, it is a system of enterprise which is not free and which is predicated for its very survival
on the continuation of an authoritarian form of political domination. This means that the
political economy - the division of political and economic responsibilities - is on a colli
sion course with democratization. Reactionary despotism shares with other forms of
authoritarianism a kind of open-endedness, a very low degree of institutionalization.
In the case of El Salvador, as you start plotting the appearance of middle class actors with
moderate, progressive platforms - all in the early and mid-sixties - you realize that this
group of actors is extremely difficult to control from the outside. On the other hand, those on
the disloyal right are accustomed to having things their way. They are not accustomed to be
ing told by anyone else what to do, despite the relative sizes of the countries involved. They
adamantly refuse to link any kind of economic reform to the policy agenda.
How did the disloyal right control the country? In the 19th century, it was done by simply
disenfranchising people and by maintaining very tight control of the countryside. In the 20th
century, with a more activist and progressive Catholic Church and with more media atten
tion and penetration of political organizers into the countryside, the response was much
more decisive. Violence and political repression increased markedly. So, when you look at
the situation in Nicaragua, in El Salvador, and, tomorrow, in Guatemala, the problem you
find is a political order which, in order to stay in power, must practice political repression.
This is a categorical imperative. This is not something that is done on a purely visceral basis.
It is a rational demand to keep the political order in place.
Such dictatorships create a common problem when they begin to deteriorate: Because
they have eliminated their challengers, there are not viable political moderates to bring
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about the process of democratization through peaceful means. In the case of Nicaragua, we
saw the dictator and his palace guard fighting the entire society. In the case of El Salvador
and the Salvadoran civil war, we see a group of actors - accustomed to winning, accustomed
to having their way, accustomed to acting outside the law - definitely and resolutely
resisting any attempts on the part of the United States to improve human rights, to go forward
with reforms, and to change the situation to a more liveable arrangement.
Two points must be remembered. First, the origins of this conflict are domestic. Now, of
course, the people who smoke cigars and drink vodka can take advantage of this situation,
but they did not invent it in the first place. Secondly, despite the apparent differences in the
amount of resources between the United States and El Salvador, the initiative remains with
the Salvadorans.
Someone from the FDR [Democratic Revolutionary Front] remarked to me not long ago
that, ironically, both the left and the right in El Salvador have been able to stave off
American initiatives. The right has refused to conform to the human rights requirements; the
left has made a mockery out of all the programs for a military victory to solve the crisis. We,
therefore, must be very aware that we have had a situation where - despite the power, the
influence, and the prestige of the United States - all of these elements are harnessed to a
more instrumental and astute way of exerting influence. I consider the disloyal right the main
obstacle to the democratization of El Salvador. We are going to have this problem for some
time, and unfortunately we do not have much time.

Ambassador Becker
Before addressing myself to the topic, I would like to ask a question: How many in the
audience have been in any of the countries in Central America south of Mexico?
I see there are just a few of you.
This is a problem and requires education of the American public. Not every American
seems to understand how vital Central America and the Caribbean area are to the welfare
and security of our country. One cannot single out an individual country. It is all one ball of
wax. Not too long ago, a majority of voters polled in three cities - San Francisco, Seattle,
and Boulder, Colorado - approved referendums asking the president in essence to abandon
Central America, to the risk of conquests by Soviet- and Cuban-supported forces in
Nicaragua with its target - El Salvador.
There is another problem I wish to note. We live in a Vietnam syndrome: We don't want
to lose one ounce of American blood even to defend our neighbors to the south. The lack of
understanding of these countries in the present-day climate has created divisiveness of
opinions.
Six months ago, at the urging of Senator Jackson and Senator Mathias, the president ap
pointed a National Bipartisan Commission on Central America to look into the social,
economic, political, and other problems in Central America to see if it could come up with a
blueprint or plan for addressing them. After six months of labor, the commission delivered a
very comprehensive plan, though not answering all the questions. The president accepted
the commission's report and passed it on to Congress to be implement~d by the appropriate
legislation. Now the Congress will debate the issues. The chairman, former Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger, is to be complimented for this difficult task. The commission report has raised
a number of questions which require immediate answers.
Last week, the secretary of defense and the secretary of state testified in detail on the im
plementation of the commission proposals. I support the president's position on the Kissinger
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Commission Reports. It is congressmen like the able Michael Barnes, who is knowledgeable
about the problems in this area and served as a counselor to this commission, who can be of
real service. For a resolution, we must rise above partisanship and demonstrate patriotism in
debating the issues candidly and acting expeditiously to bring about a solution to a real grow
ing crisis in Central America. It is a deteriorating situation.
I have been involved in many countries south of the Rio Grande for the past 30 years.
They are all different in tradition, culture, background, economics, and politics. However,
today there is a new force and dimension in that region to be reckoned with. It is the Soviet
Union-Cuba-Nicaragua axis. It could have included Grenada if the president had not acted
to keep it from establishing a base there.
During World War II, more tonnage was sunk by the Nazis in this area than in all of the
Atlantic and the Pacific. They had no base there at that time, but the Soviets now do, which
makes us even more vulnerable.
My point is that today the root of the evil in El Salvador and in Central America is, first of
all, Cuba. Cuba has the best-trained military force in the area, one that can be exported any
place in the world: Angola, South Korea, and elsewhere. They have militarized Nicaragua,
after the Sandinistas double-crossed their people following the overthrow of the corrupt
Somoza regime. Then they became surrogates of the USSR and Cuba.
These so-called guerillas in El Salvador are not "freedom fighters." They have been trained
in Nicaragua as terrorists, and terrorism is one thing Americans do not understand. A terrorist
doesn't mind killing an uncle, a brother, a father, or a son. They are fanatics and indoc
trinated with killing and violence. It is their faith; it is their cause; it is their crusade.
Now in El Salvador, there will soon be elections. The problem with the campesinos
- the peasants, who work and till the ground - is that they do not have any security to be
free to vote their consciences. They are threatened by terror, by violence, by bloodshed.
There should be fair elections conducted in an environment of fairness, peace, and security
for those who desire to participate.
I do not condone violence by either side, and I do not condone the death squads that
create terrorism and violence. However, we in the United States must, for our own national
security and that of the Western Hemisphere, protect the freedoms, liberties, and ideals on
which our country was founded. If we can send troops thousands of miles around the globe
because we are a beacon of freedom, we cannot afford to leave countries to the south of
us - our neighbors and friends - at the mercy of the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Nicaragua. I
am not crying wolf; we are in danger.
I want to leave you with one impression. These guerillas and terrorists in El Salvador are
not naive amateurs. They are well trained in Nicaragua, and today terrorism - whether it is
in the nation's capital, London, Berlin, Paris, or elsewhere - must be stopped. We must
recognize it with solutions which require priority by all Western nations if we are to have
peace.
However, we can do only so much. Dollars are not the sole answer. There are essential
social, economic, and political reforms as well. In protecting human rights, I hope and pray
that we do not shed any American blood. But there is always danger. We are arming Honduras,
a democracy, a wonderful country with friendly people, warm and not war-like in the least
and pro-United States and the West. There is freedom of the press, speech, and assembly.
Hondurans are at least 50 percent illiterate, and the death rate between birth and five years
of age is one of the highest in the world, due to malnutrition. Seventy-five percent of the
population lives in the rural mountainous areas, and their income averages about $300 per
year. That is an area we must protect and help. Hondurans and other Central American
8

countries have requested aid from Uncle Sam. Who else? We must monitor our aid programs
so they reach the campesinos.
We stopped Castro in Grenada, and it gave the Hondurans a feeling of security. They
were concerned that if they were attacked by Nicaragua, which used their country as a con
duit for supplies to El Salvador, they would be left to the mercy of Nicaragua. Nicaragua has
40,000 to 50,000 troops and 50,000 troops in reserve - all trained by Castro with heavy
military equipment: No match for the Hondurans. At their request, we installed military
bases and furnished military advisers and assistance. This protection is for Panama, Costa
Rica, Guatemala, and El Salvador.
Our security, liberty, and freedom mean something, and we must protect the liberty,
freedom, and security of our neighbors and friends to the south. We cannot let our friends
down when in need.

Congressman Barnes
My responsibility is to discuss the congressional perspective and the congressional
responsibility with respect to El Salvador. Perhaps I should focus my remarks on the criticism
that is frequently voiced by the Reagan administration of the role of the Congress in foreign
policy in Central America. The administration claims that Congress has just obstructed and
has not been helpful in any way, that we in the Congress have not contributed anything
positive to consideration of this crisis.
The Congress, it is argued, has withheld the necessary military aid and has tried to im
pose too many restrictions on military assistance to El Salvador. The administration argues
that if Congress would just get out of the way and let the president run foreign policy,
everything would be all right.
This is not a new debate in the United States over the proper role of the Congress and ad
ministration in foreign policy. It goes back to the beginning of our nation's history. You will
recall that President Washington, shortly after becoming the first president of the United
States, went before Congress to discuss the Indian Wars and was subjected to such a barrage
of questions that he left the Congress and said he would never return; and he never did. No
president since that time has been prepared to subject himself to such questioning by Con
gress in an open forum, with the exception of President Ford, who appeared before a con
gressional committee to respond to questions relative to his pardoning President Nixon.
You can go back to President Theodore Roosevelt, who had a conflict in foreign policy
with the Congress. He wanted to send the fleet around the world to show U.S. strength. The
Congress did not want him to do that. He had enough money in his budget to send the fleet
halfway, so he sent it halfway and told Congress they could bring it home if they wished.
Congress was forced, in this way, to act.
So there is nothing new about the conflict between a president and the Congress over
foreign policy and over how much money should be authorized and appropriated. It is built
into the Constitution, because the president has the responsibility to execute foreign policy.
The Congress, however, controls the money. The representatives of the p,,eople are the only
ones who have the constitutional responsibility to decide how the people's money should be
expended in carrying out a president's foreign policy. That is where the issue comes down in
the Congress: the expenditure of funds. That is where the debate centered over Vietnam:
whether to end funding. That is where the debate settles today on El Salvador.
Should there be funding for the president's cold war against the Sandinistas and
Nicaragua? The House has twice voted to terminate the funding; the Senate has voted to
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continue it. The question will come up again in June when the money runs out, and we will
go through that process again. We have had this debate continually since President Reagan
took office. What amount of funding is appropriate for El Salvador? Should we provide
military assistance or economic assistance or both, and what levels of funding for each?
Should any conditions be imposed on the assistance we provide?
As you know, Congress in 1981 enacted a requirement as a precondition for providing
military assistance to El Salvador. The president had to certify every six months that the
government of El Salvador was making progress in a number of areas: human rights, land
reform, and the holding of free elections, as well as negotiations with the left. A series of con
ditions was spelled out.
Why did the Congress do that? Was it just trying to obstruct the president's ability to
carry out foreign policy? I would argue that virtually every expert Congress has heard from
would say no.
My subcommittee has held more than 20 hearings on the question of El Salvador in the
past two years alone. Virtually every expert who has appeared before us has argued that the
crisis in El Salvador has its roots in the domestic repression and the impoverishment of the
people and that a military victory by the government of El Salvador is not likely or possible at
any cost acceptable to the people of El Salvador or to the international community.
Therefore, the ultimate solution to the crisis, the Congress has come to believe, lies in
political reform. It lies in measures to provide a better life for the people of El Salvador, and it
lies in a diplomatic or political solution to the crisis in that country.
I will always remember something the past president of El Salvador, Napoleon Duarte,
said to me at his home while he was still president of that country. What he said struck a real
chord with me. He said, "If the people of my country just believed that tomorrow was going
to be better than today and that their children were going to have a better life than they have
had, then the communists could bring in all the guns they want, but there would not be peo
ple here to pick them up and use them."
It has seemed to me that this is the real challenge to U.S. policy and to the international
community in El Salvador. It is well known that the Reagan administration has denied that.
The president has said that the crisis is, in essence, the result of communist aggression and
that we are going to draw the line. We are going to beat the guerillas. You remember all the
speeches by Secretary Haig and the others.
In taking this stance, I really believe the administration unfortunately aligned itself with
the anti-reform elements within El Salvador that have been described so ably by Professors
Baloyra and Woodward today.
The purpose of the certification requirement was to force the administration - and yes,
to force the government of El Salvador - at least to pay lip service, if not more, to the
necessity of attacking the roots of the problem. I think that is a constructive rather than a
destructive contribution by the Congress. The certification requirement is not perfect; it has
some drawbacks. But we in the Congress, particularly in the Foreign Affairs Committee, ad
dressed those defects last year and came up with a new process to replace the certification
process. It was reported out of the committee on a vote of 36 to one. The only vote against it
was by one of my colleagues who will not vote for military aid to any country anywhere
under any circumstances, and he voted against this measure even with the conditions we at
tached. All the Republicans and all but one of the Democrats on the committee voted for a
new process, but the Reagan administration did not help us in bringing it to the floor for a
vote by the entire House.
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Now we even have the Kissinger commission recommending that there be a certification
process with respect to military assistance to El Salvador - and to Guatemala - and we are
hard at work trying to develop a process that will make more sense and can attract genuine
bipartisan support. Meanwhile, we have the question of whether the old certification re
quirement will continue since it expired at the end of last year. I introduced legislation to
reenact it, and that legislation passed both the House and Senate without objection, only to
be pocket-vetoed by the president on November 30, 1983. Last week, the House passed it
again, and I suspect the Senate will pass it again, and we will continue this debate over what
amount of military assistance should be provided by the United States and under what con
ditions.
During our question and answer session this afternoon, I am sure we will get into the
recommendations of the Kissinger commission, and I look forward to that because the
recommendations of the Kissinger commission, and the president's response, are going to be
the key issues of debate in Congress over the next few weeks. We had Secretary Shultz and
Secretary Weinberger before our committee just this past week presenting the recommenda
tions of the commission. Over the next few weeks, we will have to debate and vote on exactly
what we are going to do about them. How much money are we going to provide and under
what conditions, if any? The experts present here today can contribute to my understanding
of these issues.

Ambassador Orfila
Let me give you the point of view of a foreigner who loves this country and who has
been here for many years.
First of all, this is a very difficult issue, an extremely difficult issue.
Secondly, you cannot talk about El Salvador alone. You must talk about Central
America. I think Professor Woodward made that point very well.
The issue is an issue in which the Americans are actually on the spot. Now, why are you
on the spot? Because you must pay a price. You will pay a price in your own public opinion,
and you have seen different opinions even on this panel. You will pay a price with the Latin
Americans.
Without any doubt, it has been a policy of neglect by the United States of Latin America
for many years, with the exception of two periods. One was the presidency of Franklin
Roosevelt who undertook the Good Neighbor Policy. The other was the presidency of John
Kennedy and his Alliance for Progress program. It is difficult for me to remember other
policies that really have had an impact in Latin America. I sincerely hope that the Caribbean
Basin Initiative will be the beginning of a policy toward Latin America.
The United States' presence in Latin America is not based on ideology. It is not the
presence of a democracy, the extraordinary democracy that you are and the extraordinary
country that you are. It is the presence of either government or business. You see the interna
tional socialists and the Christian democracies attending practically every major event in that
region: inaugurations, national celebrations, and other such events throughout Latin
America. I have never seen a delegation for the Republican Party or the Democratic Party as
such present to represent the democracy in this country.
I feel the only thing you can do is let the Central Americans and the Contadora group
find a solution by themselves. Pass the responsibility to the Latin Americans themselves and
follow very closely because I do not totally agree with what Ambassador Becker said in the
sense that this is an area of extreme strategic importance to you. Of course you cannot let
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things just happen in Central America; it is too close to you. But you must be extremely
careful in how you move into that area.
Congressman Barnes mentioned political reform. He is right. The trouble in Central
America is that we are now reacting when we should have acted 20 years ago. We all knew
what was coming. Any one of us who had visited the countries of Central America knew that
one day Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala were going to undergo some sort of change.
It was impossible to maintain the situations existing in those countries. But there was no at
tention given to the area outside the regular, normal relations and the investments that a few
had in the area.
The Contadora group formed by Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia, and Panama are now
trying to find a solution with the five Central American countries. And I insist that you cannot
talk about El Salvador alone because El Salvador has a direct interest in what is happening in
Nicaragua, and Nicaragua has the same interest in events in El Salvador. Furthermore, you
cannot disregard Honduras and Costa Rica, which always have been separated from such
problems in Central America, and who are particularly concerned about the fact that they
have no means of defending themselves. What the Contadora group can do is come up with
a dialogue with all the parties in Central America.
Unless the solution to the Central American problems are Central American solutions, I
cannot see what a viable solution would be. I know that it would be very difficult for some
people to understand. I know, too, that it is extremely important to keep what happens in Cen
tral America foremost in your minds because the situation does threaten the security of the
United States. You must be extremely careful not to confuse North-South with East-West.
We are now in the media. We are always in the media. Latin America has never been so
much in the media as now. Why is this? Why has El Salvador become so important suddenly?
It is because El Salvador is a development problem. It is also because El Salvador has become
an East-West problem more than a North-South problem. Until there is an intelligent, com
prehensive development policy for Latin America, we will continue to have such problems
in that region. If we had such a policy today or if the Alliance for Progress had been con
tinued, we would not have the problem of El Salvador today.
On a related subject, can you imagine what it would be like today dealing with the prob
lem of El Salvador if the issue of the Panama Canal had not been resolved some time ago? I
know firsthand of the opposition to the return of the Panama Canal. I attended many
meetings in this country where it was obvious the people were very hostile to that decision.
But the United States responded in a most magnanimous way. One of the largest countries in
the world dealt with one of the smallest countries in the world as equals, and a treaty of
which you should be proud was signed. It solved a problem. Again, El Salvador is a problem
that you must let the Latin Americans resolve.
Money is not the answer. It is sometimes difficult to decide to use money. It is far more
complicated, and money cannot cut through the complications.
The Kissinger report was important with respect to its recommendations. However, it is
important in another way: because it is the Kissinger report. If it was the Williams report or
the Smith report, people would not have paid much attention to it.
Latin America has been taken for granted for too long, and now the United States is pay
ing the price of this neglect. Until there is a policy of economic development carried out by
the United States in that region, prepare yourselves for other problems - problems that are
similar to those in El Salvador - elsewhere in your own backyard, Latin America.
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Dr. Woodward
Ambassador Becker says we should actively defend our friends to the south. Ambassador
Orfila says we should let the Contadora group find a political settlement there. I support Am
bassador Orfila's position.
We have had a hundred years of doing it "the American way," and it has not worked.
The American presence in El Salvador has been substantial for the past hundred years,
despite the fact that it only recently has made the news or attracted public interest. It was
American businessmen, American diplomats, and even American scholars who showed the
Salvadorans the way, and they often participated enthusiastically.
What we have learned in Western Europe and the United States is that capitalisr:n works
very well in other places only if it is modified every so often. Sometimes you have to
redistribute the wealth, and we do that in the United States with an income tax and with
social security. We have a number of ways of doing it, and they work pretty well.
In Central America, an unrestricted capitalism in which the rich get richer and the poor
get poorer will not work. There must be some modification of the capitalist system, especially
in El Salvador and Guatemala.

Dr. Baloyra
I think there are some philosophical underpinnings here on which liberals and conser
vatives agree. There is the view that if you find an appropriate level of resources and will
power, you can solve the problem. I do not believe·for one moment that what must be solved
in Central America is poverty because I do not know of any government that has solved that
problem. It is not, therefore, a problem of eradicating poverty, on the one hand, or
eradicating communism, on the other - certainly not totally. If those are the tasks, forget it.
It will not get done.
The problem is how to more evenly distribute unevenly distributed resources and how
to find ways to alleviate the dire conditions of life for great numbers of people in Central
America. To do that, we need a political methodology. We cannot do it with money alone.

Ambassador Becker
In my opinion, the crisis is acute. The United States has a moral and strategic interest in
this area. Doing nothing or too little are not alternatives. I agree that we should support the
Contadora group and any diplomatic channel to bring about a meaningful dialogue. Also, it
is my hope that the National Bipartisan Commission report will prompt an early solution to
the multi-complex problems - economic, social, fiscal, and political - of this region by
Congress and other countries. I support the Kissinger commission's findings and recommen
dations as well as the Reagan administration's position. It is the duty and obligation of Con
gress to resolve and find the answer in a bipartisan manner. Notwithstanding the criticism of
involvement, I can't go along with Ambassador Orfila's statement that "Central American
problems are Central American solutions" or "pass the responsibility to the Latin
Americans." Why do they always come to the United States for help? Who else will help
them in a development program when they can't help themselves?
El Salvador is the only country with a caste system of the 14 families. This oligarchy has
been the primary root of the evil for over a hundred years, resulting in rebellion and fertile
territory for Marxism and Communism. However, that is only a part of the problem. The
other critical part is the Soviet presence and the actions of Cuba and Nicaragua in exporting
arms, kidnapping, violence, murder, and terrorism. These actions prevent liberty and
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freedom for the people of El Salvador as well as free elections. In addition, our development
program is to help, hopefully, to have a democracy in this country.
I served with your famous 30th Infantry Division in World War II, the Old Hickory Divi
sion which included your native national guard and which sustained 30,000 casualties to
stop Hitlerism. Victory was our goal. I agree with the principle stated by President
Eisenhower, then Supreme Allied Commander: "When you appeal to force, there is one
thing you must never do - that's lose. There's no such thing as a little force. When you use
it, you use it overwhelmingly." We cannot afford to lose.
It is my opinion if El Salvador should fall to the communists, the countries from Mexico
to Panama will be in great danger. Our security will be in danger, and I only hope our
distinguished fellow panelist Congressman Barnes and his colleagues in the Congress will
come up with an effective program that includes a mix of developmental, political,
diplomatic, and security elements to be pursued equitably and humanely. The commission's
and president's approach calls for greater military assistance as well as expanded support for
economic growth and social reform. Violations of human rights must be ended, and
economic conditions causing poverty must be addressed. Our involvement, at their request,
will eventually enable Central America to stand on its own and live in peace. These are
humane goals and objectives.

Congressman Barnes
I want to underscore the importance of one point made by Ambassador Orfila. I think
Henry Kissinger performed a real service to our country simply by serving as chairman of the
bipartisan commission. It is absolutely correct that his international prestige raises the whole
level of the discussion with respect to what the international community should do about
Central America.
I had the chance to travel with Secretary Kissinger throughout Central America as a
counselor to the commission. Wherever we went, it was like a presidential visit. He attracted
a remarkable amount of coverage and great crowds wherever we stopped. Under such cir
cumstances, the report and its recommendations take on a whole new aura, simply because
of his participation.
Many people thought the debate would be ended by establishment of this commission.
That was naive on our part. It did not end the debate, but it raised it to a higher level of
sophistication. That has been an important contribution in itself.

Ambassador Orfila
In the final analysis, we need more people like those of you in attendance this afternoon,
people who take the time to come here and engage in these discussions of our topic. We
need more universities and more forums like the Thurmond Institute thinking about Latin
America.
Where is the hemisphere that has everything that its people need to survive and progress
as you in America have done?
How have we gotten together? How do we communicate?
Do I know the Americans simply because I speak your language and you speak mine?
We think differently. Yet we must understand that and bridge the gaps in our
understanding of each other. Programs like this help do that. We need more interchange and
thoughtful discussion like this.
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There is, of course, another fundamental consideration. It is non-intervention, which
probably means very little to you because no other nation has really intervened so directly in
the affairs of the United States. However, when the United States or any other country seizes
foreign vessels to collect national debts or when presidents are essentially named from
foreign capitals, as has happened in Latin America, those are interesting matters. The princi
ple of non-intervention is very important to smaller nations.
Central America is an important region for the United States. You must follow
developments there closely. You should put pressure on the Latin Americans to find an
answer to their problems. You should encourage the Contadora group to find the answer.
But you must be extremely careful how you apply such pressure and ensure that you do not
intervene too far in the process.

Questions and Answers
Question
There is a lot of emphasis here on the need for a multinational solution to the problems
in Central America. Given your opening observation, Dr. Woodward, that efforts at union in
Central America continue to fail and that nationalism is on the rise, what is the likelihood of a
multinational settlement?
Dr. Woodward
It is not only desirable; it is the only way it really can happen.
Despite the breakdown of inter-Central American relations since 1969, the Football War
and, subsequently, the Nicaraguan revolution, there is a surprisingly large amount of inter
Central American cooperation still in place. There is still a common market. It is not as im
portant as it once was, but it is still there. There is still an apparatus of the inter-Central
American secretariat for economic integration still in place. There are numerous agencies
that function for all of the Central American countries together. So there is a tradition for unity.
In fact, there is still a political organization for that purpose, ODECA. So things are not quite
so bleak as they may appear. There is a strong tradition of nationhood throughout Central
America. But there is also the interested involvement of Venezuela, Colombia, Mexico, and
Panama.
Ambassador Becker has talked about the terrorists in El Salvador. What about the ter
rorists operating in Honduras with U.S. aid? They are far more numerous than Salvadoran
terrorists. They are equally as brutal, if not more so.
If the United States would de-escalate the military conflict by pulling its own forces back
and stopping supplies to the terrorists who were the nucleus of the butchers under the
Somoza regime, that would be helpful. If we do that, the possibilities for success by the Con
tadora group will be much better.

Question
Ambassador Becker, do you think the upcoming elections in El Salvador can be fairly
conducted? Is it not true that those who participate will be subjected to terrorism on all sides?
How can such elections be fair in the presence of such intimidation? Will the United States
support the winner?
Ambassador Becker
By all accounts that I read about the last election, I believe there can be fair elections in
El Salvador. That has been shown.
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It is true that the guerillas fighting in El Salvador refused to participate in the last elec
tions, and I expect them to refuse this time. The presence of the United States, I hope, will
reduce the intimidation and fear so the people will be able to go to the polls and freely vote.
Secretary Schultz publicly stated that we will abide by the results no matter who is the win
ner, provided it is a free election.
Dr. Baloyra
Two years ago, I went to El Salvador as an unofficial observer, and I went with more or
less the expectation that the whole episode would be a farce. I came back and incurred the
wrath of some of my colleagues by agreeing with the assessment that, under the cir
cumstances, the elections were relatively fair.
Of course, the left did not participate. There is no way that the guerillas could come
down from the mountains one-by-one to particpate in the elections. That is out of the ques
tion. They have to go before a municipal official to get an ID .card so they can vote. The mo
ment that official asks them where they have been in the last two years, it is all over.
Even when leftist leaders have expressed a desire to meet with the government - a
meeting was scheduled in the fall in San Salvador - the problem was that the government
could not guarantee their safety. The government could not guarantee the safety of three in
dividuals meeting in a house, a diplomatic legation, on embassy grounds of a neutral country.
If the government cannot meet that kind of need, I am very pessimistic about participation by
the left in popular elections without an overall political settlement. The right wing has gone
on the warpath, and they continue to believe that the solution to El Salvador's problems is
violence.
Who will win in the coming elections? The United States hopes that Mr. Duarte will win.
But Mr. Duarte could not deliver during the last two years, and his urban base of support
among labor and other groups is weak. He got 40 percent of the vote before, and he could
not deliver. Will he do the same again?
Whatever happens in this presidential election, you must remember that the constituent
assembly remains unchanged. There will still be an assembly divided 30 to 30, and that is not
a feasible arrangement.

Question
Congressman Barnes, a great deal has been said about the propriety of the United States
providing military aid to a nation that is at war with itself and also providing military aid to
bring down the government of Nicaragua. How far can we go in trying to bring down the
government of Nicaragua?
Congressman Barnes
You have pointed out one of the most interesting questions that confronted the Kissinger
commission.
In every other respect, the commission said, "The commission believes" or "The com
mission proposes" or "The commission recommends." In this one instance, in one
paragraph, the commission said that a majority of the commission believes that the assistance
to the Contras is appropriate. There were differences of opinion among the commission
members who support assistance to the Contras as to why they support it, but there was a
solid majority of the commission that supported such assistance.
Of course, you must remember how the commissioners were appointed. President
Reagan was very careful in his selection of the members of the commission. Two members of
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the commission did specifically dissent on this issue. One was Mayor Henry Cisneros of San
Antonio, and the other was Yale Professor Carlos Diaz Alejandro. They argued that the
United States should suspend all assistance to the Contras through 1985 in order to test the
legitimacy of the reforms the Sandinistas say they are prepared to undertake and to test their
sincerity as regards their statements that they would cooperate with the Contadora effort.
This is consistent with the view of a majority of members of the House of Representatives, as
I have indicated. The House has voted to terminate U.S. assistance to the Contras for these
and other reasons, and that is certainly my view.

Question
Ambassador Becker, how can you argue that we must meet force with force when it is
obvious that one of the problems we have in Central America and in El Salvador is that too
much force already is being used to suppress the people politically?
We have seen how brutal force can be on both sides. It sounds like you would embrace
violence by the right but not by the left. There are terrorists on both sides.

Ambassador Becker
Let me say that I did not condone the corrupt Somoza regime which was overthrown by
the Sandinistas. It was a brutal regime. Nor do I condone the violence and terrorism of the
Sandinistas. There is no place for violence or terrorism anywhere in the world. That goes for
both sides in El Salvador. I draw no distinction of violence between the left and the right.
Over a long period of time, as Ambassador Orfila has stated, we have neglected our own
backyard. And we have allowed the Soviets to build up their military and ideological power
base in our backyard - first in Cuba, then in Nicaragua, and now in El Salvador. They are
training guerillas to destroy democracy. It is no wonder that Dr. Baloyra is pessimistic about
the upcoming elections. The problem is that many people will not feel free to vote in an elec
tion because of fear - certainly the campesinos - unless they are given protection.
Notwithstanding the presidential election Dr. Baloyra referred to, it is true that we are
still going to face a constituent assembly that will be attacked by the guerillas. Just last week,
the leader of the guerilla forces said he would not interfere with the elections. Then the next
day, the guerillas struck a government installation and murdered 50 to 100 people in the
garrison.
When is the dialogue going to start, and when is the bloodshed and violence in El
Salvador going to stop?
My feeling is that you have to meet force with force. To understand that, you have to live
in some of these countries and try to understand the world in which the campesinos live. In
certain countries, they live in constant fear of guerilla activities. For the most part, they
are illiterate and unsophisticated. So you are dealing with individuals who cannot operate or
maintain either civilian or military equipment. But the guerillas have the edge in every way.
We must stop their expansion of communism and export of terrorism. We are the only coun
try that can stop them. Also, we can use allies.
I do not care if it is Honduras, El Salvador, London, the Middle East, or any place else in
the world; terrorism, violence, and bloodshed must stop. We cannot sit by and ignore this
problem. We must come to grips with it on a top priority basis. This is not only our problem,
but one for the Western Hemisphere and the Western world. It is essential to try and save
democratic governments from aggression, as they cannot survive under such conditions.
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Question
Is the problem in Central America and in El Salvador one of military and political stability,
or is it a matter of holding the country militarily while we wait for however long it takes to
come up with a development strategy for that region? It could take a long time to bring that
region up to where it is stable economically and developmentally.

Ambassador Orfila
As I have stated, the key is development, with the United States taking the lead to bring it
about.
El Salvador and the entire Central American area and, in fact, all of Latin America needs
U.S. investments. What type of investments? U.S. investments that go to promoting exports,
so these nations can be relatively equal to the United States and other nations of the world as
trading partners.
A great deal of the character of these nations is determined by the level of U.S and other
nations' investments. In the past, however, the nature of the investments in the area were
atrocious. The investors tried to dominate the nations in which they invested. They violated
the laws of those nations. They manipulated the governments to their own needs. That gave
the United States a bad image among Latin Americans. Frankly, you do not deserve such an
image. You have to change it. You have to prove to the Latin Americans what you really are.
They don't know about small town America. You are not an antagonistic people, but Latin
Americans see you that way.
Do not confuse nationalism with communism. You must understand that nationalism is
not the same thing as communism to Latin Americans. No Latin American seriously can be
communist or Marxist in view of our strong religion, or origins, our history of individualism in
Latin America. We do have nations that are tending toward Marxism, but that is an anomaly.
Something has gone wrong. The direction of development - and the lack of proper atten
tion to their development - has led to this. We have other nations in the hemisphere that
are turning toward Marxism.
The soil in this hemisphere is fertile for democracy. Although there may have been a
time when we in Latin America did not understand democracy, times have changed.
If we had a policy for development of these countries, then we would not have the
serious situations we are experiencing today in some of the countries of Latin America. That
is true for regions other than Latin America as well. Central America, on the other hand, is to
day's problem. We have other problems, but if we can understand nationalism in Latin
America we can address the main problems that confront us today. We will also understand
how to prevent a vacuum caused by unsuccessful nationalistic movements to be filled by
other ideologies foreign to us.
One final point that you should remember: You need us in Latin America as much as we
need you. The Caribbean Basin Initiative may be a bridge to a development program toward
the whole of Latin America that will make this hemisphere stronger and more interdepen
dent and trusting of each other.

Question
Dr. Woodward, what role can the church in El Salvador play in bringing about a
peaceful reconciliation of these competing forces and stability throughout all of Central
America?
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Dr. Woodward
That is a very complex question because the answer is a multiple answer.
The church has played many roles. The church's role has traditionally been one of
"stabilizer" of society and protector of the masses. It was denied that role in the late 19th
century. The liberals diminished its capacity to serve the masses. More recently, there has
been a major development in the church. The church has sought to go back to its traditional
role. It has emphasized liberation theology, the obligation of the Catholic Church to the
poor, and the need for laymen to get involved. This has spl it the church in Central America,
and some of the liberation theologists have gone much further than others. Many of them
have supported revolution.
One of the unique things about the Sandinista Marxists is that they are very close to the
Catholic Church. By contrast, the established church - the hierarchy - has become
somewhat of an enemy to the Sandinistas. In El Salvador, there are clergy with the guerillas.
So the church is very active.
In Guatemala, the Jesuit and Maryknoll Orders have been particularly active in pro
moting social reform and even revolution.
Protestant churches are also very important, particularly in Guatemala, and they have a
different role, a very complex role. For a hundred years, the Protestant churches have carried
on a major missionary effort which had little effect until the past 20 years in terms of any kind
of promotion of economic development. The Protestant churches also have emphasized the
participation of laymen, not only in the church, but also in a social development role, and I
think we need more of that.

Closing Remarks
Dr. Arbena
I regret that time precludes further pursuit of some of the issues raised in this discussion.
It is apparent, however, that a great deal of light has been shed on fundamental issues
underlying the crisis in El Salvador. For bringing such light to bear, we are grateful to our
distinguished panelists.
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